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Abstract
It is well known that the parametric version of Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) proposed
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (KT) can explain
gambling at actuarially unfair odds on long shots due to the over weighting of small
probabilities. However betting on odds favorites appears problematic. We demonstrate using
a parametric model of Cumulative Prospect Theory that nests that of Kahneman and Tversky
that if agents are risk averse enough over gains and risk-seeking enough over losses then they
will gamble on odds on chances at actuarially unfair odds even when there is no probability
distortion. This previously unappreciated fact is interesting since many experimental results
suggest that some respondents are very risk averse over gains.
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Introduction 
It is well known that Cumulative Prospect theory (CPT) proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (KT) can explain gambling at 
actuarially unfair odds on long shots due to the over weighting of small probabilities. 
However the model is seemingly unable to explain gambling on odds on favorites at 
actuarially unfair odds. This is because the under weighting of high probabilities, in 
conjunction with the assumed degree of loss aversion, apparently precludes such 
gambles.
1 However we demonstrate using a parametric version of CPT, which nests 
the model of KT, that if agents are risk averse enough over gains and risk-seeking 
enough over losses then they will gamble on odds on chances at actuarially unfair odds 
even when there is no probability distortion. This previously unappreciated fact is 
interesting since, as we detail below, many experimental results suggest that some 
respondents are very risk averse over gains.  
The rest of the letter is structured as follows. In the next section we set out our analysis 
and the final section of the note is a brief conclusion. 
 Section 1 
Defining reference point utility as zero, expected value or utility, Eu, in the most 
general formulation of the CPT model for simple gambles, is given by  
Eu w p U so w p U s
g =− − () ( ) ( ) () 1
l                                                                              (1) 
where p is the objective probability, o, is the odds and s   is the stake.   is the 





                                                           
1 Cain et al (2005) demonstrates that the assumption of greater probability distortion over 
losses than gains, the opposite of that assumed by KT, can also generate gambles on odds on 
favourites at actuarially unfair odds.  
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Our parametric specification of the CPT model employs the expo-power function of 
Saha (1993). Substitution of the expo-power function in (1) gives us  
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α                                                         (2)                                  
where r,α , n and k are positive constants.  
The expo-power function has the useful property that it nests the power value function 
specification of KT as , (by L’Hopital’s Rule) but resolves a number of 
theoretical and empirical objections to power value functions.
α→0
2 Köbberling and Wakker 
(2005) and Giorgi and Thorsten Hens (2005) in different applications of CPT to that of 
                                                           
2 Holt and Laury (2002), using small real payoffs, find that risk aversion increases sharply 
as payoffs are increased and agents choose between a “safer” and “more risky” gamble. 
With a power value function this would not occur. This result is consistent with early 
experimental evidence, e.g. Markowitz (1952), Biswanger (1980). They keep the 
probabilities in a sequence of gambles fixed as agents choose between a gamble and its 
certainty equivalent. They also find that choices change significantly with size of payoff. 
Conlisk (1989) finds no evidence of the Allais paradox in experiments employing small real 
stakes where the majority of respondents choose the risky gamble. This contrasts with Allais 
experiments using identical probabilities and large payoffs (e.g. Allais 1953) where agents 
typically choose the safe option in one of the Allais gambles. These different choices over 
the hypothetical payoffs, if meaningful, can only be reconciled by rejecting power utility.  
There are also important theoretical objections to the power assumption. Blavatsky (2005) 
shows that the Kahneman-Tversky parameterization cannot resolve the St. Petersburg 
paradox unless the power coefficient of the utility function is less than that of the probability 
weighting function. Such an assumption as we show below precludes gambling on long 
shots. In addition unless the parameter of the power value function is the same over gains 
and losses, as assumed by KT,  the assumption of loss aversion will be violated over small 
enough stakes. However equality of parameters implies stake size is indeterminate in 
gambles  see  Köbberling and Wakker (2004), Cain et al (2005) and Law and Peel (2005)). 
  2gambling also suggest that a bounded value function is more appropriate than a power 
specification.  
We assume in our examples that the probability weighting functions over gains and 
losses,   and   have the form suggested by KT w p
+( ) w p
− − ( 1 )
























11   and  w                                   
where    are positive constants.                                            δ  and ρ
For   the agent is everywhere risk-averse over gains and risk-seeking over losses, 
as postulated by KT. The degree of loss aversion, (LA) is defined by the ratio of the 
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0, so that the degree 











 for all s. This condition is consistent with the definition of loss 
aversion of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005)). For the 
expo-power function this implies the additional constraint that r ≥1.  
 Differention of (2) with respect to stake size gives us the optimal stake size, s, as 
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with the second order condition    
ro
n −> 1 0                                                                                                                     (5) 










1                                                                                                             (6) 
This condition is precisely that required to undertake gambles with the power value 
formulation of KT, but in that model optimal stake size is indeterminate.  
What has not been appreciated previously is that (6) can hold for odds on favourites when 
the gamble is actuarially unfair if n is small enough
4. As n becomes smaller the agent 
becomes more risk-averse over gains and more risk-loving over losses. 
 To illustrate suppose there is no probability distortion, so δ ρ =1 and  =1 and also r=10. 
k=20 and n=0.25. .  We define the expected return from a one unit gamble,µ , as 
  µ =+ po ( 1 )                                                                                                          (7) 
so that a gamble is defined to be actuarially fair whenµ =1.   
We suppose for illustrative purposes that µ =0.94737, the expected return to a one-unit 
gamble at roulette. In figure1 we plot the relationship between expected utility and the 
objective win probability when stake size is optimal and given by (4). We observe 
                                                           
4 Cain et al(2005) note that an agent might  obtain positive utility in bounded models 
of CPT with  very large scale gambles at odds on ,  since as stake size goes to infinity  
  4from the plot that expected utility is positive and at a maximum at p=0.9325. 
Consequently this agent would be happiest when playing roulette betting thirty-five of 
the thirty-six numbers, at objective probability win probabilityp ==
35
38
092105 . . 
In figure2 we plot the relationship between expected utility against the objective win 
probability when µ =0.5,  stake size is optimal,δ ρ = 061 .,  = 0 . 6 9 , r=10, k=20 and 
n=0.88. These are the parameter values suggested by the KT experiments when α is 
small, (Tversky and Kaneman (1992)).  In the figure we observe the agent optimally 
betting on an extreme longshot at very unfavorable odds. 
In Figure3 we plot the indifference curve between the win probability and the power 
exponent, n, when expected utility in  (2) is set at a fixed small amount greater than 
zero with µ =0.94737,  , r=10. k=20,  δρ = 061 .,  = 0 . 6 9 α = 00001 .  and stake size, s, is 
set equal to one.  We observe from the figure that the agent will gamble on relative 
long shots for high enough values of n and odds on chances for low enough values of 
n. even though the agent under estimates large probabilities, with a consequent 
disincentive to gamble, ceteris paribus.  
 Our new result, that agents in CPT will optimally gamble on odds on favorites if the 
degree of risk-aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses is large enough, is more 
than just of theoretical interest. Clearly agents are observed to gamble on odds on 
favorites, where by construction the majority of the money is bet, and the standard 
parametric version of CPT cannot explain this. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
reported estimates of   of 0.61, ρ=0.69 and n = 0.88, implying that the agents in their 
experiments would gamble on longshots at unfair odds, as of course they recognized. 
δ









expected utility is positive if   However they do not consider optimal 
  5However many other studies report estimates of δ and n that implies absence of 
gambling on longshots.
5 For instance Camerer and Ho (1994) report 
=0.56, , Wu and Gonzalez (1996) report  δ n = 0225 . δ=0.71, n=0.5, Bernstein et al 
(1997) , n = 0.05, and Stott (2005) report  δ=098 10 .  or . δ=0.96, n=0.19. Our analysis 
demonstrates that such agents could gamble on odds on favorites at actuarially unfair 
odds. 
Conclusions 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) pointed out that CPT predicts both insurance and 
gambling for small probabilities but that their analysis fell far short of a fully adequate 
account of these complex phenomena. The major contribution of this letter has been 
to demonstrate that a parametric model of CPT, in which the value functions are given 
by the bounded expo-power function of Saha, can provide a coherent explanation of 
optimal gambling on both long-shots and odds on favorites at actuarially unfair odds. 
Perhaps surprisingly, unlike betting on long shots, optimal gambling on odds on 
favorites can be explained without recourse to probability distortion. Another 
interesting result is that agents with identical degrees of loss aversion and a non-zero 
degree of probability distortion can differ markedly in their choice of gambles 
dependent on the degree of risk aversion and risk-seeking they display over gains and 
losses. This can explain not only the preference of agents for gambling on odds on 
favorites or long shots but also choices made in Allais paradox type questions, though 
we leave analysis of that for another paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
bets and the implications of different values of n. 
5 Cain et al (2005) show that a necessary condition for betting on long shots is that the 
elasticity of the weighting functions over gains, given approximately by δ  for p<0.5, has to 
be less than the elasticity of the value function over gains, which  for small stakes is equal 
approximately to  n. 
  6The analysis suggests that it would be useful to supplement the standard questions 
employed in experiments to elicit values of δ and n with ones where respondents are 
asked to choose between unfair gambles involving long shot and odds on chances, 
both with the same expected value.  The choices in the latter questions can be 
examined to see whether they are consistent with the values of δ and n derived from 
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            Figure1:  Plot of Expected utility  and                                   Figure2: Plot of Expected utility and win   
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µδ ρ = 094737 . , r = 25,k =50,n = 0.25, =1, =1. µ δ ρ = 05 . , r = 25,k =50,n = 0.88, = 0.61, = 0.69.
 





Figure 3:  Indifference  curve between the  
                 power exponent,  n, and win probability   
 










µα δ = 094737 . , r = 25,k =50, = 0.0001, = 0.61, 0.69,s=1.
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